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The court in Grillo found the limitation of the multiple listing
service to a restricted membership to be an unreasonable restraint.
But it did not distinguish between membership restrictions and the
refusal by the Board to furnish multiple listing information to nonmembers. By ordering multiple listing information to be made available to all real estate brokers for the asking, Grillo did what Associated
Press specifically refused to do. Undoubtedly the initial fee and waiting
period were unreasonable," but the court might have examined the
specific circumstances surrounding the actual denial of membership
to the plaintiff. An examination of the refusal to furnish information
might then have been made absent the objectionable membership restrictions. However, the court apparently was not prepared to consider
these factors. It characterized the business of real estate brokers as
subject to a "specific public interest" 46 and preempted from private
restraints by a "comprehensive scheme of public regulation," 47 concluding that there was no legitimate basis for refusing membership.
It is questionable whether standards imposed by statute for obtaining
and retaining a professional license sufficiently promote the advancement of professional standards and protect the public in its real estate
dealings.
Grillo suggests, at least, that a business association in a field with
which the public is vitally concerned has an obligation to open its
membership to all who seek to participate. But the interest which the
public has in the conduct of real estate business is hardly any greater
than that in many other commercial activities. 48 In this respect the
decision presents grave implications for many local business associations organized to advance commercial standards and efficiency.
WILLIAM MCCLUtRE SCHILDT

SUBCHAPTER S AND THE ONE CLASS OF STOCK
REQUIREMENT
Courts developed the thin corporation doctrine to deal with the
problem presented when invested capital was "dressed-up" to appear to
be a loan, with consequent income tax advantages both to the corpor45"There can be no proper justification for a large participation fee to be paid

by a new board member to become a participant in the Multiple Listing activity.
Any initial charge should be related to the actual cost of starting the services
to him." Dep't of Bd. Services, supra note 1, at 10.
46219 A.2d at 643.

471d. at 648.
4

8The court itself intimated as much. Id. at 643.
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ate-borrower and to the stockholder-lender." When invested capital is
disguised as a loan, the thin corporation doctrine is applied to pierce
the disguise and reveal the true character of the transaction. Nomenclature is disregarded and a purported corporate debt is treated as
invested capital. 2 The corporation is then deprived of the attendant
tax advantages, and amounts paid as interest on the purported debt
are treated as capital distributions, for which, unlike interest payments, the corporation is not permitted a deduction in calculating its
taxable income.3 Amounts paid to stockholders as repayment of principal with respect to the so-called debt are treated as dividends on
stock, taxable to the stockholder rather than as a nontaxable return of
4
capital.
Soon after Congress enacted Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,r which allows a small business corporation to elect to
be taxed as a partnership or as a proprietorship, 6 it was suggested
that the thin corporation doctrine might be applied to defeat the
lHrusoff, Election, Operation and Termination of a Subchapter S Corporation,
11 Vim. L. REv. 1, 9 (1965); Stinson, Terminating the Election Under SubchapterS, N.Y.U. 18TH INS-nT. ON FED. TAx 707, 721 (1960).
There are two basic reasons for thinly incorporating. Frequently the only
way by which a closely held corporation can secure adequate financing is by
loans from shareholders. There are also tax advantages. With respect to capital
furnished by loans, the tax advantages are threefold. First, the periodic payments
to the lenders for making the loans are deductible by the corporation as interest
payments; second, repayment of the advances is tax free; and third, the loss
sustained when the corporation fails is deductible as an ordinary loss in the case
of a business bad debt or as a short term capital loss if the loss is not a business
bad debt. Kahn, How To Plan a Safely Thin Corporation in Face of Today's
Obstacles, 8 J. TAXATION 341 (1958). The thin corporation doctrine was
promulgated to prevent corporations from disguising capital advances as -debts
and
thereby receiving these tax advantages. 24 J. TAxATIoN 373, 374 (1966).
2
See 0. H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.
1960), which is one of the leading thin corporation cases. The case sets out
eleven factors to be considered.
3
Hrusoff, Election, Operation and Termination of a Subchapter S Corporation,
II ViLL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1965); Stinson, Terminating the Election Under Subchapter
S, 4N.Y.U. 18THi INsnT. oN FED. TAx 707, 721 (1960).
Hrusoff, Election, Operation and Termination of a Subchapter S Corporation,
II ViLL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1965).
5Irr. REv. CoDE oF 1954 §§ 1371-77. The provision was suggested by President
Eisenhower in his 1954 budget message to Congress and enacted in 1958. The
complementary provision whereby a partnership could elect to be taxed as a
corporation was enacted in the 1954 Code in §§ 1361. This latter provision has
recently been repealed by P1L. 89-389.
0
Louire, Subchapter S After Six Years of Operation. an Analysis of Its Advantages and Defects, 22 J. TAXATION 166, 167 (1965); Patty, Qualification and
DisqualificationUnder Subchapter S, N.Y.U. 18mTINsnT. ON FED. T.4x 661, 662-63
(1960).
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election.7 Before a corporation can elect to qualify under Subchapter
S, it must meet certain requirements, relating mainly to the nature and
number of shareholders: 8 it must be a domestic corporation which is
not a member of an affiliated group, have fewer than eleven shareholders, have only individuals or estates for shareholders, not have
any nonresident alien shareholders, and have only one class of stock.9
The regulation with regard to the one class of stock requirement

provides:
[O]nly stock which is issued and outstanding is considered....
If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not identical with respect to the rights and interests which they convey
in the control, profits, and assets of the corporation, then the corporation is considered to have more than one class of stock. Thus,
a difference as to the voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation
preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation....
If an instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is actually
stock, it 'will constitute a second class of stock.10
The suggestion that application of the thin corporation doctrine would
7
See Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation,N.Y.U. 17TH INSTT.
TAx 771, 819 (1959); Manley, Election Under Subchapter S Can
Eliminate Thin-IncorporationProblem, 9 J. TAXATION 322, 323 n.2 (1958); Patty,
Qualification and Disqualification Under Subchapter S, N.Y.U. 18TH INsTr. ON
FED. TAx 661, 669-70 (1960); Roberts & Alpert, Subchapter S: Semantic and
Procedural Traps in Its Use; Analysis of Dangers, 10 J. TAXATION 2, 4 (1959);
Stinson, Terminating the Election Under Subchapter S, N.Y.U. 18TH INsnTh. O.
FED. TAx 707, 721 (1960).
See generally Kahn, How To Plan a Safely Thin Corporation in Face of
Today's Obstacles,8 J. TAXATIoN 341 (1958).
8
Note, 19 TAx. L. REv. 391 (1964).
91NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a) 1-4. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1504(a)
for the definition of a member of an affiliated group.
10Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (g) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6676, 1963. (Emphasis
added.)
Since the writing of this comment, the Commissioner has changed § 1.1371-1
(g) of the Regulations by dropping the last sentence italicized in the text, and by
adding the following: "Obligations which purport to represent debt but which
actually represent equity capital will generally constitute a second class of
stock. However, if such purported debt obligations are owned solely by the
owners of the nominal stock of the corporation in substantially the same proportion as they own such nominal stock, such purported debt obligations will be
treated as contributions to capital rather than a second class of stock. But, if an
issuance, redemption, sale, or other transfer of nominal stock, or of purported
debt obligations which actually represent equity capital, results in a change in a
shareholder's proportionate share of nominal stock or his proportionate share of
such purported debt, a new determination shall be made as to whether the corporation has more than one class of stock as of the time of such change." Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1 (g) (1959), as amended T.D. 6904, 1967 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 5,
at 13.
ON FED.
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disqualify automatically an electing corporation was based on the last
sentence of the above quoted regulation. The theory was that if the
"debt" was in reality a contribution to capital under the thin corporation doctrine, the evidence of the "debt" would be a second class
of stock and the corporation, now having more than one class of
stock, would not qualify for the taxation treatment of a partnership."
However, the Tax Court in W. C. Gamman12 recently refused to
apply the thin corporation doctrine to a Subchapter S election. Gainman and Reese, the two stockholders involved, 13 formed Century
House, Inc. to build and operate a motel near the proposed site of the
Seattle World Fair. Century House was thinly incorporated. Each of
the stockholders paid $200 to the corporation for capital stock and
advanced over $5,000 to the corporation in return for 6 per cent demand notes. At various times in the succeeding years the two stockholders made additional advances to the corporation because it had
been unable to secure anticipated outside financial aid. These advances
in excess of $250,000 were evidenced by 6 per cent demand notes.
At the time of trial no interest had been paid on the notes, nor had
any effort been made by the stockholders to demand payment of the
obligations. From time to time new notes were issued to replace the
old ones to prevent the statute of limitations from barring collection.
The Commissioner disallowed deductions for losses incurred by
Century House which Gamman and Reese had taken on their individual income tax returns on the ground that Century House did
not qualify as a Subchapter S corporation. Consequently, the only
question presented in Gamman was whether Century House met the
one class of stock requirement and could qualify as a Subchapter S corporation.
In a six-to-five decision, 14 the Tax Court held that Century House
IlHenderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (ND. Ala. 1965), did in fact
reach this result.
1246 T.C. 1 (1966).
13 There were three stockholders when Century House was formed but the
corporation later bought the stock of the third stockholder and paid off his
advances without interest. This third stockholder does not bear in the determination of this case so, for the purpose of simplicity, he has been left out of the
discussion.
14The five dissenters said that there were two classes of stock since the notes
in question were risk capital and not genuine indebtedness and since these instruments established different rights and preferences from those of the authorized
stock. The dissenters argued that it was no answer to say that those different
rights and preferences made no difference simply because they were not
enforced nor because there was no evidence that the holders intended to enforce
those rights later.
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had only one class of stock for Subchapter S purposes, and so qualified
as a Subchapter S corporation. The first step in the court's reasoning
was to reject as invalid the last sentence of the regulation dealing with
the one class of stock requirement:
[W]e find nothing in the law itself, the committee reports, or the
assumed purpose of the legislation that would justify holding,
arbitrarily and per se, that all instruments which purport to be
debt obligations but which in fact represent equity capital, must
be treated as a second class of stock for purposes of section 1371.
Consequently we think the last sentence of the regulation . . . is
too broad and places a restriction on the stockholders of the
electing corporation which was not intended by Congress ...
Where a regulation is an amendment or modification of the statute
and therefore beyond the power of the Commissioner to make,
courts must refrain from giving it effect.15
This led the court to a consideration of the facts. It concluded
that the notes were evidence of capital contributions but were not a
second class of stock because they did not give Gamman or Reese any
rights or preferences different from those they already had as owners
of the capital stock of the corporation. The following facts were
mentioned as being determinative: The advances were made and the
notes were held pro rata to the stockholdings; the right to periodic
interest payments was waived; the right to demand payment of the
notes was never exercised; the notes gave the stockholders no voice
in the management of the corporation; and in case of bankruptcy it
was highly likely that a court would have subordinated the claims
of the noteholders to the other common creditors.
There are two earlier cases, Henderson v. United States16 and
Catalina Homes, Inc.,' 7 which apply the thin corporation doctrine
to defeat a Subchapter S election. The Tax Court distinguished those
cases from Gamman on the ground that the last sentence of the regulation was not challenged in either case. While this is a distinction, it
is doubtfully one on which the difference in result should be based.
Henderson simply held that the advances by the stockholders represented capital contributions and a fortiori a second class of stock under
the last sentence of the controlling regulation.
Catalina,however, is distinguishable on its facts. There interest, like
dividends, was payable only at the direction of the board of directors
1546 T.C. 1,5-6 (1966).
16245 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ala. 1965).
1733 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1491 (1964).
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and the advances were preferred over the no-par common stock. It
is obvious that the notes were a second class of stock since the rights
and preferences were not the same as those enjoyed by the no-par
common stock. The fact that Catalina considered those factors represented a loosening, however slight, from the a fortiori approach
taken by Henderson. Gamman took the reasoning one step farther
and expressly repudiated the a fortiori approach. Just because an advance is deemed a capital contribution, it does not necessarily follow
that the capital contribution results in a second class of stock. This
point has since been recognized in Lewis Bldg. & Supplies, Inc.'8
The Gamman holding is a step in the right direction. However, the
Tax Court did not squarely meet a fundamental point: whether the
thin corporation doctrine should have any applicability. The court
said:
We also observe that while we have given lip service to the socalled thin capitalization doctrine we have some doubt as to its applicability in determining whether a corporation has more than
one class of stock for purposes of Subchapter S. 19
Properly analyzed, the doctrine has no applicability to a Subchapter
S corporation. The tax advantages which normally accrue do not
benefit a Subchapter S corporation since the corporate earnings pass
directly to the shareholder.
A corporation remaining permanently in the tax option status
would have no reason to desire a thin financial structure. Election
of the tax option status allows a corporation to freely distribute
its earnings without a tax effect. A corporate deduction for interest paid to a stockholder would be meaningless, and the accumulated earnings tax would not be applicable.2 0
For this reason, application of the thin corporation doctrine itself to
the Subchapter S corporation is meaningless. It only confuses two separate and unrelated problems.
Elimination of the application of the thin corporation doctrine to
Subchapter S situations does not eliminate the necessity of determining
whether a note evidencing the corporate indebtedness is a stock. Some
of the factors considered in the thin corporation cases would still be
18f 66,159 P-H TAx CT. RP. & MEM. DEc. The case did not mention the
invalidity of the regulation nor the correctness of using the thin corporation
doctrine.

1046 T.C. 1, 8 (1966).

20Garver, Tax Factors Affecting Debt-Equity Financing for a New Small
Corporation,17 XV. Res. L. Rev. 773, 779 (1966).

